In his lead essay, Capt. Hendrix argues that the United States is ill-prepared for a multipolar age and its resultant great power competition. To shake off the bad habits engendered by our unipolar moment, Hendrix urges us to study the multipolar systems of pre-World War II eras, to strengthen our alliances with other democratic nations, and, more broadly, to conjure the will to defend the “Empire of Liberty” which American statesmen have built over the past eight decades. There is much to admire in Hendrix’s piece, and he is largely correct in his prescriptions. But Hendrix mischaracterizes the nature of the global environment in a way that carries important implications for both how we prepare a new generation of diplomats and how we respond to the urgencies of the moment. We are not just witnessing the return of multipolarity and old-fashioned great power competition. Future historians will identify the early 2020s as a critical juncture period that launched the start of a new Cold War. The actions our leaders take now at the start will determine the trajectory of Cold War II. If we desire to preserve the Empire of Liberty, America and her allies must acknowledge the true nature of this conflict and prepare for bold, proactive leadership that both defends liberal democracies in Europe and Asia and challenges the new Axis bloc.
See the Threat
Because Hendrix identifies today’s international stage as a great power competition, he urges us to tap into the pre-World War II diplomatic tradition rather than that of the Cold War. As he writes, the onset of the “Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union … signaled the advent of an age of bipolar competition” that was a deviation from the historical norm of multipolarity. Accordingly, we should familiarize ourselves with the complicated dance that the United States and the European powers conducted during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Invoking the pre-WWII tradition, however, is somewhat misleading. There is surely little harm in studying Palmerston or Metternich, but we should do so with an understanding that today’s Beijing and Moscow are not yesteryear’s London or Vienna.
In the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, the European great powers were alike insofar as they were led by monarchs steeped in relatively similar cultural heritages and motivated by relatively mundane interests. With the important exception of Napoleon’s outbursts, the powers were led mostly by Christian monarchs driven by a desire for land rather than utopian visions and adept at Richelieu-style diplomacy. That is, they pursued their interests by working within the reigning system rather than by trying to upend that system. Perhaps most important, these older, more respectable powers were not yet familiar with the specter of nuclear arms—a factor Hendrix rightly notes about today’s environment.
Today’s emerging power centers are not only more united than the shifting European blocs of the past, they are also more ideologically motivated and armed to the teeth with apocalyptic machinery. The ideological fervor and constant threat of holocaust make today’s world order far more akin to that of the twentieth century. Like in the first Cold War, the world powers are coalescing into two camps that are generally defined by their preference for or opposition to liberal democracy. Rather than working within the American-led, liberal democratic system, China, Russia, and Iran are explicitly committed to and acting on a desire to replace that system. Their disdain for liberal democracy forms the bedrock of their union and introduces an ideological component to their alliance that complicates comparisons to previous multipolar ages.
Also like in the first Cold War, the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides makes direct conflict between the major players unlikely; they will test their strength instead via proxy wars. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine shows this well. To win the new Cold War, the United States and the democratic bloc must not only shore up faith in their own relations, they must also secure a victory in Ukraine and prepare for a more menacing conflict in the South China Sea.
Circle the Wagons
Made possible by Chinese economic relief and aided by Iranian drones, the invasion of Ukraine was the opening salvo of the new Cold War. A proxy battle between the authoritarians and the democrats, its importance is steeped in symbolic weight as much as it is in strategic imperative. Precisely because we are in a new Cold War, however, the symbolism of the conflict is heightened to a stature equal to or greater than more measurable, strategic factors. The ideological backdrop of the conflict draws the attention of democrats in Africa, Asia, and Latin America hoping to defend their gains and would-be authoritarians eager to exploit any perceived weakness in liberalism. The signal of a democratic victory is today more important than Putin’s controlling Europe’s breadbasket.
Because of this symbolic importance, the United States and the West must do more to aid Ukraine and, in the process, weaken the morale of the new authoritarian bloc. While American aid has been generous, it has also been slow, truncated, and constrained. For example, only in May of this year, two years after the war began, did Washington permit Ukraine to fire American-supplied weapons into Russian territory. But even this greenlight permits only strikes against Russian forces just across the border. Ukraine must be able to strike deeper and more decisively against Russian forces before, not after, they constitute a threat. Such constraints, combined with delays in delivery of much-needed weapons and supplies have turned the conflict into a war of attrition that can only be remedied by more resolute and timely support from the Western democracies.
In addition to ramping up the defense of Ukraine, Westerners will have to strengthen deterrence against China in Taiwan. If, as Niall Ferguson has argued, Ukraine is like the previous Cold War’s Korea, then Taiwan could well be the new Cold War’s Cuban Missile Crisis. In other words, Taiwan could be the location of a direct confrontation between the leader of the democratic bloc, the United States, and the leader of the new authoritarian bloc, China. As is now common knowledge, China has modernized its military with breathtaking speed over the past two decades and, accordingly, has grown more assertive in the South China Sea. Western leaders are waking up to this reality. Taiwan, for example, has increased its defense spending by 25 percent this year, in part due to Western encouragement. This is a promising development, but China’s military spending still dwarfs that of Taiwan. True deterrence will require a bold move from the United States, perhaps even a public commitment to protect the island democracy’s sovereignty.
Our mission should be to end the Cold War by fostering a true multipolarity in which the current anti-democratic axis powers realize that their hatred for us does not seriously exceed their hatred for each other.
Ukraine and Taiwan are the two hottest spots on the Cold War map. Their future depends on stronger democratic alliances. Hendrix and I fully agree on the need for strengthening ties with democratic allies and NATO’s example in Ukraine shows why. Not only has NATO proven crucial for delivering aid and arms to Ukraine in the past two years, it was also instrumental in training the Ukrainians in the years leading up to the conflict, reorienting its military from a Soviet-style command structure to a more dynamic, Westernized force. In other words, NATO’s anticipatory work in Ukraine prevented the country from becoming the Poland of the 1930s or the rest of Eastern Europe of the 1940s, giving the Western powers a defensive edge in the new contest. The collaboration among NATO powers must be replicated in other regions, particularly in East Asia. While countries like Japan and South Korea have been reliable allies to the West, the partnerships between our intelligence agencies, militaries, and economies should be deepened.
These recommendations form only a part of the broad strategy Western powers must pursue should they wish to win this contest. I agree with Hendrix on the need for the West to pursue deeper economic ties with the Global South (i.e., the Third World). Africa has been enthusiastically courted by China which understands well the future economic potential behind the continent’s fast-growing population. India, too, with its large population and innovation potential, will play an important role in the West’s defense. But these proposals still are too reactive; they are essentially defensive postures taken against a threat that has already materialized and shown its teeth. To win the Cold War, indeed to prevent World War III, the West requires a more proactive approach to its enemies.
Untying the Knot
In some ways, our mission should be to end the Cold War by fostering a true multipolarity in which the current anti-democratic axis powers realize that their hatred for us does not seriously exceed their hatred for each other. The authoritarian states share a common disgust for liberal democracy, but their respective positive visions for replacing the liberal order point to irreconcilable, if momentarily manageable, differences. Moreover, as Rear Admiral Parry pointed out in his response, the domestic political structures of authoritarian states are built on shoddy foundations. These are weaknesses that the United States can and should exploit.
In negating liberal democracy, each of the new axis powers asserts its own vision for a new illiberal future coupled with its own unique institutional configuration. In Moscow, Putin harkens back to Tsarist traditions, styling himself as a founder of sorts ushering in a new age of Russian self-consciousness. In Beijing, it is the Chinese Communist Party that combines elements of Marxist-Leninism with Chinese nationalism. In Tehran, it is clerical rule indoctrinated in the Shia resistance theology of Ayatollah Khomeini. These three orientations combined with longstanding historical animosity do not promise an immediate disintegration of the Axis partnership. But they give American and Western policymakers a strong hand to play.
As Hendrix notes, Russia and China are not natural allies, but historic enemies. Even under their current “friendship,” there are simmering tensions within their business sectors and among their intelligentsia concerning Russia’s far-east provinces and Central Asia. Given the nationalism of Russia and the universalism of China’s communists, territorial disputes could lead to a long-term breaking point. Indeed, the historical animosity helped Nixon and Kissinger drive a wedge between the two countries in 1972 despite their shared Marxist orientations.
Iran is an even less natural ally to China. Though Iran’s biggest trading partner, China’s communism is an awkward match with Iran’s revolutionary and expansionary Islamism. The incongruity is amplified by China’s genocide of the Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang province. The Iranian regime officially refuses to comment on the Uyghurs while reformist elements in the country’s parliament use it as proof of the need to reorient the country to the West.
Exploiting these cleavage points is not something our diplomats can simply make happen, to be sure. But it is the type of strategic thinking in which they should be engaged. One possible avenue is leveraging the various sanctions regimes the United States has imposed on each of the countries. Even China, for all its perceived self-sufficiency, is still economically dependent on trade with the United States.
Finally, within Iran and Russia—though, less so in China—domestic unrest is a common feature of the regimes. Russia faced its own protests after the Ukraine invasion and Iran seems to brutally repress a mass, anti-regime protest every few years. In Iran in particular, not only are opposition groups becoming more liberal, they increasingly see China as implicated in the clerical regime’s survival. To the extent that it is able, the United States should work covertly with these various opposition movements and foment protests to pressure democratic reform. Actively pursuing regime change is surely irresponsible, but working with underground movements sympathetic to or desirous of democratic reform is as American as Radio Free Europe was during the first Cold War.
All of the above prescriptions assume an American leadership with the desire and will to preserve Jefferson’s Empire of Liberty. At this critical juncture, there is plenty of reason to doubt that such leadership will emerge. Even if it does, it will be no easy task. It will require the rhetorical strength of FDR and Ronald Reagan paired with the political imagination of Marshall and Nitze. Then again, few in the 1930s would have thought the United States would step up to the plate against fascism. Even fewer at the time would have thought it would lead the world against another totalitarian empire after the Nazis. The emergence of a new enemy may be precisely what America needs to pull it from its malaise and produce a new generation of great leadership.
